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Abstract
Competitive conditions in the banking sectors in the light of transition process in the 
Central and Eastern Europe countries (CEE) has been subject of interest for 
researchers and policy-makers, especially upon entry of foreign banks and 
concentrated markets. In this paper the Panzar-Rosse approach is used to assess 
competition of banking sectors in CEE. By using General Method of Moments on the 
panel data for 300 banks for the period 1999-2009, empirical evidence indicates that 
banks operating in the CEE exert monopoly behaviour. From the methodological 
point of view, the findings suggest that using a price equation or controlling for total 
assets in a Panzar-Rosse approach produces upwards biased and invalid estimates 
of the H-statistic. Therefore, further support is provided for maintaining a reduced-
form revenue equation when estimating a Panzar-Rosse model. The findings also 
suggest that banks operating in the non-EU countries of the CEE region have exerted 
stronger market power compared to the banks operating in the EU countries of this 
region. Policy-makers should improve competitive conditions and general ‘enabling’ 
environment for the banking sectors, especially the non-EU countries of the CEE 
region, while balancing competition-stability trade-off. 
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1. Introduction
Before the transition process, the banking system in most CEE countries was 
characterized by monobank systems. For example, in ex-Yugoslavia, each republic 
had a few banks that operated in different segments consistent with the central 
planning of the economy. Overall, banking system competition in the CEE countries 
may be considered to have been inexistent or highly limited. In most countries, the 
transition from the monobank system into the two-tier banking system produced 
concentrated market structures. This due to the inheritance of asset portfolios by 
a single bank, or a few banks. In addition, the entry of foreign banks was limited 
in early years of the transition process. The degree of financial intermediation 
was very low, while the interest rate spreads were high (World Bank, 2016). This 
surrounding environment was key for banks operating in concentrated markets and 
exert market power. However, the banking reforms consisting of the privatization 
of the state-owned banks and the elimination of barriers to entry for foreign banks, 
resulted in a large number of foreign banks entering the markets in CEE. The entry 
of foreign banks is considered to have been fundamental to the development of 
modern banking systems in this region and induced the banking system competition 
by bringing capital, know-how and technology into these markets (Bonin et al., 
1999; Tang et al., 2000). The CEE countries recorded some progress in developing 
competition policy and institutions, but the progress was slow and most of the CEE 
countries lag behind the more advanced countries of the Euro Area. Hence, the 
aim of this paper is to estimate the degree of banking system competition in the 
CEE countries. This will enable an assessment of the hypothesis ‘whether banking 
sectors were transformed into competitive markets or still exert high market 
power’.
Although rich body of the literature measures competition in banking, there is no 
general agreement which is the most appropriate method. However, the approach 
developed by Panzar and Rosse (1987), which directly quantifies the competitive 
behaviour, has been largely recognized as a more appropriate approach compared 
to the structural methods. Based on this approach, competition is measured by the 
elasticity of bank revenues to the change of input prices, which indicates whether 
the competitive behaviour of banks is consistent with monopoly, monopolistic 
competition, or perfect competition.
In this paper, the Panzar-Rosse method is used to estimate banking system 
competition in 16 CEE countries for the period 1999-2009.4 Moreover, interaction 
terms are used to test the hypothesis whether the degree of banking sector 
4 The countries included in this study are: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, the 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, 
Serbia, Slovakia, and Slovenia. 
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competition in the non-EU countries differs from the degree of competition in 
the EU members of the CEE region. Unlike most of the other studies in the CEE 
countries context, this paper follows Bikker et al. (2012; 2007). The authors suggest 
not to scale the dependent variable to total assets and not to include total assets 
as an explanatory variable in a Panzar-Rosse model. By doing so, it is aimed at 
eliminating the misspecification bias that is present in most of the studies that 
have applied the Panzar-Rosse approach. Another model specification issue for the 
Panzar-Rosse model is related to the choice between total revenues and interest 
revenues to be used as dependent variables. The regression using each of these 
variables is estimated in order to check if they produce consistent results. The 
estimation of the Panzar-Rosse regression is conducted on dynamic panel data 
using the General Method of Moments (GMM).
To summarize, the main hypothesis of this study is to estimate if the banking sector 
in the CEE countries exerts monopoly behaviour. In addition, the hypothesis if there 
are differences in the competitive behaviour of the banks between the EU and non-
EU member countries of the CEE region is tested. Another important objective of 
this study is to test the hypothesis of Bikker et al. (2012; 2007). Authors claim that 
the scaling of the dependent variable to total assets or controlling for total assets in 
a Panzar-Rosse model produces an upwards biased and always positive H-statistic. 
This may be considered a misspecification problem of the model. Lastly, we aim 
to check whether the choice between using total income or interest income as a 
dependent variable makes a significant difference to the results produced by the 
Panzar-Rosse model.5
This paper is organized as follows. In the next section, a theoretical background 
on the approaches used to measure competition and a brief review of empirical 
literature in the CEE countries is presented. In section 3 the model and methodology 
is described. In section 4 the empirical data and the analysis are presented. In 
section 5 estimation results and findings are discussed. Section 6 concludes.
2. Literature review
Banking system competition is generally viewed as the driving force for the 
development of an efficient banking system. The relevance of competition, 
however, is related also to its potential role in the stability of the banking system 
– with the mainstream view claiming that competition leads banks to higher risk-
taking. The interest of both, academics and policy-makers in banking sector, the 
competition has been reignited by the recent global financial crisis. Many believe 
5 Relating competitive behaviour of banks with their risk-taking appetite and pricing is important, but 
falls beyond the scope of the paper. For these relationships see Mustafa (2014). 
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that competition has contributed to the incidence of the crisis. However, in spite 
of its high importance for the banking system and the economy as a whole, the 
literature still has not come to a general agreement on the most appropriate method 
for measuring competition. The literature in this field is divided into two major 
streams, consisting of structural and non-structural approaches. 
The structural approach for the measurement of competition mainly relies on the 
Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) paradigm. This approach relates competition 
to the degree of market concentration. The SCP paradigm originates from the work 
of Bain (1951), where he analysed firms’ performance in 42 industries in the US 
during the 1930s. The results of this study suggested that firms operating in more 
concentrated industries with higher entry barriers generated higher rates of return. On 
the other hand, firms operating in less concentrated industries and those with lower 
entry barriers generated lower rates of return. These findings were interpreted as 
evidence for the SCP paradigm. In its original form, the SCP paradigm maintains that 
an exogenous market structure influences the conduct of banks and their performance. 
More specifically, the SCP paradigm claims that a higher degree of concentration 
grants market power to incumbent firms. This enables firms to behave in particular 
ways, such as colluding with each other and resulting in higher profits. However, in 
most of the studies dealing with the SCP paradigm, firms’ conduct is not explicitly 
taken into account. Therefore, it is rather the structure-performance relationship 
which is explored and a particular type of conduct or behaviour is only assumed.
Despite its extensive use in the literature, the SCP paradigm has been subject to 
criticisms that contest its ability to explain the competitive conditions in a market. 
The most important criticism is the assumed one-way causality from market 
structure to conduct and then to performance. According to Vesala (1995), market 
structure and conduct are endogenously determined. More specifically, it is 
unreasonable to exclude the feedback effects from potential strategic behaviour of 
firms, i.e. the conduct of firms, to the market structure. One of the most widely 
reported critiques to the SCP approach is represented by the Efficiency Structure 
hypothesis which was developed by Demsetz (1973). Similar to the SCP, the 
efficiency structure hypothesis is a structural approach, but often referred as the 
alternative of the SCP paradigm. This view claims that higher profits of firms 
operating in concentrated markets are a result of the superior efficiency of larger 
firms deriving from economies of scale and not from the market power. Another 
important view that criticizes the SCP paradigm is the Contestability Theory, 
developed by Perrakis et al. (1982) and Baumol (1983). According to this theory, 
firms behave competitively also in a concentrated industry or even in a monopoly 
if the market is contestable – perfectly contestable markets are those that are 
characterized by free entry and costless exit.
These critiques led to the development of the non-structural approaches which 
do not take into account the structural features of the market when measuring 
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competition. The most commonly used non-structural approach is represented 
by the method of Panzar and Rosse (1987), hereafter referred as the P-R method, 
which is a non-structural approach, grounded in the microeconomic theory. This 
method measures competition by directly quantifying the conduct of firms and 
not taking into account the market structure. In assessing competition, the focus 
of the P-R method is on the competitive behaviour of firms rather than on market 
structure, implying some similarity between this approach and the contestability 
theory. Some studies, such as Bandt and Davis (2000), Nathan and Neave (1989) 
and Yildirim and Philippatos (2007) use the P-R approach to test the contestability 
theory by measuring the competitive behaviour of banks in markets characterized 
by a high degree of concentration. The non-monopoly behaviour of banks found 
in these markets supports the predictions of the contestability theory, according to 
which a concentrated market can be characterized by competitive behaviour if there 
is a credible threat of entry by new entrants.
The P-R method has previously been applied in a number of studies that have 
investigated banking sector competition. A number of empirical studies such as 
Bikker and Groenveld (1998), Bikker and Haaf (2002), Casu and Girardone (2006), 
Hahn (2008), Staikouras and Fillipaki (2006) have used the Panzar-Rosse approach 
to estimate banking sector competition in the EU countries for different period 
of times and generally found that the competitive behaviour was consistent to 
monopolistic competition. Similar results were found also by Apergis (2015), who 
used this approach to estimate banking sector competition in a set of 21 emerging 
market economies for the period 2002-2012. Several authors have used the P-R 
approach to measure the degree of competition in the banking sectors of the CEE 
countries. Yildirim and Philippatos (2007) used this method to estimate banking 
sector competition in the CEE countries for the period 1993-2000 and found 
that the banking systems of these countries were characterized by monopolistic 
competition. Similar results were found also by Mamatzakis et al. (2005) who 
estimated banking sector competition in the SEE countries for the period 1998-
2002, and Delis (2010) who covered the CEE countries for the period 1999-
2006. More diverse results were found by Delis (2010) who used this approach to 
measure the degree of banking sector competition in 22 individual CEE countries 
for the period 1999-2006. The author found that the competitive behaviour varied 
between monopoly and monopolistic competition through the sample of countries, 
with the highest market power noted in Kazakhstan and the lowest in Poland. More 
recently, Memic (2015) used the Panzar-Rosse approach to estimate banking sector 
competition in Bosnia and Herzegovina and found that the competitive behaviour 
of banks operating in these countries was consistent to monopoly or perfectly 
collusive oligopoly. 
Another widely used approach that does not take into account the structural features 
of the market when measuring the degree of market power is the Lerner Index. The 
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Lerner Index measures the mark-up of price over the marginal costs for each bank. 
Higher values of the index indicate a higher degree of market power being exerted 
by the investigated banks.
A recently developed non-structural method for the measurement of competition is 
the Boone Indicator, introduced by Boone (2008). The Boone Indicator estimates 
the degree of competition based on the idea that competition increases the market 
shares of more efficient firms and reduces the market shares of inefficient firms. 
In this context, the larger the impact of efficiency on the increase of firms’ market 
shares, the higher is considered to be the degree of competition in that market 
and vice versa. Kasman and Carvallo (2014) have used the Boone Indicator to 
assess banking system competition for a sample of Latin American and Caribbean 
countries over the period 2001-2008.
3. Model and methodology 
The P-R method produces the so-called H-statistic which measures the sum of 
elasticities of bank’s revenues with respect to input prices. In other words, the 
H-statistic indicates how a bank’s revenues respond to an increase of input prices. 
The value of the H-statistic indicates whether the conduct of banks is in line with 
the notion of monopoly, monopolistic competition, or perfect competition.
The basic model for estimating a P-R model is presented in equation 1: 
ln(revi) = α0 + β1ln(fundingcosts)i + β2ln(labourcosts)i + 
+ β3ln(physicalcapitalcosts)i + Σni=1γiδi + ε 
(1)
where, i indexes the banks; rev represents the bank revenues; fundingcosts, 
labourcosts and physicalcapitalcosts represent the input prices; δ is a vector 
of control variables; and ε represents the error term. The sum of the elasticity 
coefficients of the bank revenues with respect to the changes of input prices 
(β1+ β2+β3) produces the H-statistic. That explains whether banks’ competitive 
behaviour is in line with monopoly (H≤0), monopolistic competition (0<H<1) or 
perfect competition (H=1).
A smaller or equal to zero H-statistic (H≤0) implies that the increase of input prices 
leads to a decline of bank revenues which implies that the competitive behaviour 
of the banking system is in line with monopoly. An H-statistic of between zero and 
one (0<H<1) corresponds to monopolistic competition, implying that an increase 
of input prices leads to a less than proportional increase of the bank revenues. 
The banking system is considered to be operating in perfect competition when the 
H-statistic equals one (H=1), implying that an increase of input prices leads to a 
proportional increase of bank revenues.
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One of the key assumptions upon which the P-R model is built is that banks are 
operating in long-run equilibrium. To test whether the banking market is operating 
in long-run equilibrium, previous studies using this approach have estimated 
a regression similar to equation 1, but using Return on Assets (ROA) as the 
dependent variable. The model produces an HROA that is the sum of β1+ β2+ β3, 
which represents the sum of the elasticities of bank profitability with respect to the 
input prices. The market is considered to be operating in long-run equilibrium when 
HROA=0, thus implying that in the long-run equilibrium bank profitability is not 
statistically correlated with input prices (De Rozas, 2007). However, Bikker et al. 
(2012) claim that HROA must not necessarily equal zero if the market is in structural 
equilibrium but under imperfect competition. In this view, when the market demand 
is characterized by some degree of elasticity, the monopolist will not be able to pass 
the entire increase of costs to the customers and HROA will be negative.
The estimation is conducted using the system General Method of Moments 
(GMM) dynamic panel estimator, which was initially developed by Arellano and 
Bond (1991) and extended by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond 
(1998). The “system” GMM estimates the model by creating a system of two 
equations for each time period, where one equation is a first-order differenced 
model instrumented by lagged levels as in Arellano and Bond (1991). In the second 
equation variables are held in their original levels and instrumented with lags of 
their own first differences. By using the GMM method to estimate our model, we 
follow Goddard and Wilson (2009) who suggest that the Panzar-Rosse revenue 
equation should be estimated using the GMM method in a dynamic formulation, 
claiming that the adjustment towards market equilibrium is partial rather than 
instantaneous.
In order to ensure that our model does not suffer from misspecification issues, we 
have run a number of diagnostic tests. The diagnostic tests in the GMM approach 
start with the tests on the validity of instruments. The instrument validity test 
can be performed in two ways: a) Arellano-Bond tests for first-order and second-
order serial correlation in the residuals; and b) the Sargan test of over-identifying 
restrictions.
The Arellano and Bond (1991) GMM estimator requires that there is no second-
order serial correlation in the error term of the first-order differenced model. In our 
case, this requirement is satisfied given that the null hypothesis of no second-order 
serial correlation cannot be rejected. Therefore, the instruments are valid. However, 
for this test to be reliable the model should have first-order autocorrelation in the 
differenced error terms. This implies that errors in levels do not follow a random 
walk. The null hypothesis that there is no first-order serial correlation in the error 
term can be rejected at the 1% level of significance, suggesting that the test for 
second-order serial correlation in our regression is reliable.
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The other tests on the validity of instruments are represented by the Sargan test and 
Hansen test, which test whether the overidentifying instruments are uncorrelated with 
the error term. The Sargan test is not robust to the presence of heteroscedasticity and 
autocorrelation, whereas the Hansen test is robust to both and, as such, is considered 
to be more reliable (Roodman, 2005). In our case, the Sargan test rejects the null 
hypothesis that the instruments are uncorrelated with the error term, but the hypothesis 
is not rejected by the Hansen test with a p-value of 0.402. While the Hansen test is 
preferred, it can be weakened (i.e. its ability to reject the null hypothesis of validity 
of overidentifying instruments) in the presence of “too many instruments” (Roodman, 
2009). The presence of this problem is shown by a p-value close to 1. However, this 
does not appear to be a problem in our regressions.
The Hansen test statistics can be used also to test the validity of subsets of 
instruments through the Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument 
subsets. In this regard, we test for the joint validity of the differenced instruments 
used for the level equation. The test results suggest that the null hypothesis that 
differenced instruments are valid may not be rejected (p-value = 0.389), hence 
providing support to the choice of the “system” GMM against the “differenced” 
GMM to estimate our equation.
Another concern related to the specification of panel data models has been raised 
by Sarafidis et al. (2009), who claim that panel data are likely to suffer from cross-
sectional dependence, which may arise due to spatial dependence, economic 
distance and common shocks. In order to tackle this problem, we have followed the 
conventional method of including year dummies in the model. However, Sarafidis 
et al. (2009) claim that the inclusion of time dummies may not be sufficient to tackle 
the problem of cross-sectional dependence. These authors suggest that the above 
tests of instrument validity may be indicative for the presence of a cross-sectional 
dependence problem. In this regard, our results that there is no evidence of second-
order serial correlation in the residuals may imply that there is no heterogeneous 
error cross-section dependence. 
Given that one of the main assumptions of P-R model for the measurement of 
competition is that markets are in long-run equilibrium, we have investigated 
this by estimating equation 2 with the return on assets (ROA) as the dependent 
variable.6 The estimation provided an HROA coefficient (measuring constant 
elasticity) of -0.01, which can be considered as very close to zero and, hence, 
makes the P-R model applicable for our sample of data. The fact that the joint 
impact of the input prices on the ROA is statistically different from zero might raise 
concerns on whether the market is in long-run equilibrium. However, taking into 
account the suggestion of Bikker et al. (2012) that HROA must not necessarily equal 
6 In line with Claessens and Laeven (2004), the measure of ROA is expressed as ln(1+ROA) in order 
to adjust for potential negative values that might have occurred due to bank losses in any year.
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zero if the market is in structural equilibrium but under imperfect competition, we 
consider that the P-R approach is applicable to our sample of data. In addition, the 
introduction of dynamics in our model enables a gradual adjustment towards the 
long-run equilibrium.
3.1. Model specification
The P-R model used in this paper is in line with most of the studies that have used 
the this model to measure banking sector competition, with some modifications 
related to the control for banks’ size. In addition, among the control variables, 
macroeconomic and institutional variables are included to control for country-level 
factors that might have an impact on bank revenues. The model has the following 
form:
ln(int_int_realit) = α0 + β1ln(int_inc_realit–1) + β2ln(p_fundsit) + 
+ β3ln(p_labourit) + β4ln(p_physcapitalit) + β5equity_tait + 
+ β6loans_tait + β7prov_loansit + β8rgdp_growthit + β9ebrd_bankrefit + 
+ β10dv_foreignit + β11dv_originit + β12dv_yearit + β13dv_countryit + εit 
(2)
where, i = 1 … 294 indexes the banks; and t = 1999 … 2009 indexes the years.
Table 1: Description of variables
Variable Description
int_inc_real interest income adjusted to inflation
p_funds interest expenses / total funding
p_labour personnel expenses / total assets
p_physcapital other operating expenses / fixed assets
loans_ta total loans / total assets
prov_loans loan-loss provisions/total loans
equity_ta equity / total assets
Rgdpgrowth real GDP growth rate
ebrd_bankref EBRD index of banking reform
dv_foreign dummy variable for foreign ownership
dv_origin dummy variable for the country-of-origin of the bank (1 for EU-12 or US)
dv_year dummy variables for years
dv_country dummy variables for country
Source: Authors
One of the issues that must be considered when specifying a model like this 
is the choice of the dependent variable to represent bank revenues. Most studies 
have used interest income as the dependent variable. Some studies have used 
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total income as the dependent variable considering that non-interest income was 
continuously increasing its share in the total income. Given that the banking sectors 
of the CEE countries are mainly concentrated in the traditional banking activities, 
where interest income largely dominates the overall structure of bank revenues 
(on average 73% of total revenues7), the dependent variable in our main model 
specification is the interest income (int_inc_real). Nevertheless, we run a separate 
regression also with the total income (tot_inc_real) as the dependent variable in 
order to check if the results are consistent.
The decision to use the absolute value of the interest income and total income 
as dependent variables, rather than scaling them to total assets which has been 
practiced by most of the studies, is based on Bikker et al. (2007). The authors 
claim that the scaling the income variable to total assets misspecifies the P-R 
model. According to this view, by scaling the income variable (both interest 
and total income) to total assets and by including total assets among the control 
variables, transforms the revenue equation into a price equation. Using a price 
variable instead of revenues as the dependent variable produces an H-statistic 
that measures the elasticity of prices with respect to input prices, rather than 
the elasticity of revenues to input prices. Hence, the derived H-statistic will 
be positive even when the market is characterized by monopoly behaviour, 
because the monopoly price is an increasing function of the marginal cost. This 
means that scaling the dependent variable (interest income or total income) to 
total assets will always produce a positive H-statistic, implying that monopoly 
will always be rejected. In order to test the hypothesis of Bikker et al. (2007), 
separate regressions are run to test if and how the H-statistics produced from the 
regressions with an unscaled dependent variable differ from the regressions that 
use a scaled dependent variable.
The selection of the variables for the input prices follows the intermediation 
approach (Sealey and Lindley, 1977). This approach treats banks as firms that 
produce loans by using deposits and other loanable funds, labour, and capital 
as inputs. Therefore, in line with most of the studies applying the P-R model to 
measure banking competition, input prices in our model consist of three categories: 
a) price of funds (variable p_funds), which is measured by the interest expenses to 
total funds ratio; b) price of labour (variable p_labour), which is measured by the 
ratio between personnel expenses and total assets; and c) price of physical capital 
(variable p_physcapital), which is measured by the other operating expenses to 
fixed assets ratio. Although the list of input prices variables is based on a standard 
and traditional exposition of input prices following the intermediation approach, 
it should be noted that the underlying assumption is uniform banking technology. 
Modern banking model should be revisited to take into account advances in banking 
7 Based on own calculations by using the data from the Fitch-IBCA Bankscope database.
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business and the digital economy. However, data limitations often pose a problem in 
revising the representation of inputs and outputs (and pricing) in banking business, 
which may be one of the reasons why the studies using the Panzar-Rosse approach 
still stick to this definition of bank inputs.
The input prices represent the variables of the main interest in our model. The 
sum of their coefficients will produce the H-statistic, which is our measure of 
competition. In line with the literature in this field, the dependent variable (int_inc_
real) and the variables on the input prices (p_funds, p_labour, and p_physcapital) 
are transformed into natural logarithms in order for the coefficients of the input 
prices to be interpreted as constant elasticities.
A number of variables are included to control for bank-specific features that may 
affect bank revenues. The bank-specific control variables include the loans to total 
assets ratio (loans_ta), the equity to total assets ratio (equity_ta), and the quality 
of the loan portfolio measured through the loan-loss provisions to total loans ratio 
(prov_loans). In line with Bikker et al. (2012), the regression does not contain total 
assets as an explanatory variable to control for bank’s size. According to Bikker et 
al. (2012), the inclusion of total assets among the explanatory variables entails the 
same bias as the scaling of the dependent variable to total assets. This transforms 
the reduced-form revenue equation into a price equation. In order to test the 
hypothesis of Bikker et al. (2012), a separate regression is run in which the total 
assets (logta) variable is included, to check whether and how the H-statistic differs 
from the regressions run without controlling for total assets.
The regression controls also for the potential impact of the macroeconomic 
environment on banks’ revenues, by including the real GDP growth (rgdpgrowth). 
In addition, the regression controls also for the impact of banking reform, using the 
EBRD index of banking sector reform. Higher values of the index indicate a more 
advanced level of banking reform.
Given that foreign-owned banks have a large presence in the banking systems of 
the CEE countries, we control also for the impact of bank’s foreign ownership by 
including a dummy variable (dv_foreign) that specifies whether the bank is foreign. 
In addition, since the foreign banks that operate in the CEE region originate from 
different countries, we consider that the origin of the foreign banks may play a role. 
Hence, the variable dv_origin is included in the model to control for the impact 
of the country origin of the foreign banks. According to Haselmann (2006), the 
activity of the foreign banks is mostly determined by the strategic considerations of 
the parent banks. In order to take into account the potential impact of time-specific 
effects, the model includes a complete set of year dummies (dv_year). Since the 
banks included in our sample are from different countries, a complete set of country 
dummies are included in the model in order to control for country-specific effects 
(dv_country).
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4. Empirical data and analysis
At the beginning of transition i.e. the creation of the two-tier banking system, the 
banking system experienced the creation of oligopolistic market structures in most 
of transition economies (Papi and Revloltella, 1999). In some countries, the asset 
portfolio of monobanks were inherited by a single state-owned commercial bank. 
In other countries the previous specialist banks were transformed into state-owned 
commercial banks, implying that in general the banking systems were dominated 
by a small number of large banks (Bonin, 2001). All these banks were state-owned, 
large in size, segmented in different sectors of the economy (e.g. trade, agriculture 
and infrastructure) and that the market was still not open to foreign-owned banks. 
Therefore, it may be considered that they possessed substantial market power and 
the likelihood of competition taking place between those banks was non-existent 
or very low. The possibility of these banks competing with each other was limited, 
particularly due to the lack of commercial banking experience which prohibited 
them from differentiating their products or introducing new financial products in 
the market.
The privatization process and the entry of new banks in the market created 
conditions for the evolution of banking system competition. This especially 
happened after the foreign banks started to enter the banking markets of the 
transition economies. This reduced the market power of the domestic banks and 
introduced modern commercial banking practices. The new banking technologies 
and products that are usually introduced by foreign banks are expected to induce 
local banks to engage in more competition (World Bank, 2013). By the end of the 
first decade of transition, the number of banks in all CEE countries had substantially 
increased and foreign banks were present in all the countries (Table 2). 
However, from 2000, a wave of banking consolidation engulfed the region, thus 
leading to a decline in the number of banks in most countries. The consolidation 
trend was driven by the stronger banks being encouraged to take over the weaker 
banks in order to preserve financial stability, bank shareholders that decided to 
exit the market, and the mergers of the parent banks of some of the foreign banks 
operating in the region (Gelos and Roldos, 2004).
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Table 2: Number of domestic and foreign banks in CEE, 1999-2009
 Years











































































































































































































































































































































































Note: Numbers in brackets represent foreign banks.
Source: EBRD, Transition Report (various issues 1998-2014); CBK, Annual Report (2013)
The consolidation process created concerns about a potential increase of the degree 
of market concentration which, according to the Structure-Conduct-Performance 
(SCP) paradigm, would imply a decline in the banking system competition. This 
under the assumption that a market with fewer and larger banks is more likely to 
be characterized by uncompetitive behaviour. However, the degree of market 
concentration does not appear to have increased after the consolidation process. 
Market concentration, measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, appears to 
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have followed a gradually declining trend after 2000 (see Table 3). The reason why 
the consolidation process has not led to increased market concentration may be 
due to the fact that the taken-over banks, or the banks that exited the market, were 
mostly small banks. Estonia is the country which recorded an increasing trend of 
market concentration index, but the increase does not appear to have been related to 
the decline in the number of banks in this country.
Table 3: Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (deposits market), 1999-2009
 Years
Countries 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Albania  8,859  6,978  7,672  4,696  4,019  3,618  2,957  2,631  2,342  2,311  2,358 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina  3,069  3,273  2,005  1,254  1,165  1,264  1,252  1,327  1,162  1,302  1,527 
Bulgaria  2,305  1,947  1,482  980  968  990  858  865  1,077  1,084  1,210 
Croatia  1,457  1,440  1,873  1,143  1,258  1,206  1,204  1,158  1,034  1,233  1,269 
Czech Republic  4,213  1,559  1,707  1,725  1,690  1,570  1,626  1,657  1,669  1,701  1,844 
Estonia  -  -  4,926  3,773  3,743  5,092  5,483  5,948  5,791  6,500  7,751 
Hungary  2,103  1,732  2,078  1,416  1,361  1,250  1,169  1,186  1,206  1,154  1,311 
Kosovo  -  -  5,388  4,239  3,005  2,639  2,642  3,043  3,121  2,933  2,545 
Latvia  -  -  -  1,101  1,033  998  1,178  1,083  978  1,099  1,228 
Lithuania  -  -  -  2,625  2,582  2,338  2,050  2,109  2,115  2,031  1,950 
Macedonia  3,892  3,781  3,722  2,614  2,601  2,397  2,403  2,225  2,145  2,023  2,218 
Montenegro  -  -  -  3,705  3,141  2,597  3,924  3,616  3,079  2,785  2,390 
Poland  1,568  1,311  1,262  1,198  1,007  915  885  886  950  781  831 
Romania  1,830  2,169  2,624  1,432  1,513  1,283  1,122  1,210  1,192  1,098  1,051 
Serbia  5,236  5,813  2,749  1,238  1,115  832  854  835  793  821  811 
Slovakia  1,701  1,445  1,609  1,767  1,680  1,616  1,355  1,546  1,370  1,447  1,496 
Slovenia  1,964  1,990  -  2,289  1,767  1,727  1,579  1,533  1,548  1,354  1,421 
Source: Fitch-IBCA Bankscope database and authors’ calculations
Even though market concentration is largely regarded as a measure of competition, 
this view has increasingly been criticized. For example, the contestability theory 
maintains that a concentrated market will be characterized by competitive behaviour 
if there is a credible threat of entry by new entrants (i.e. if there are no or low 
barriers to entry for potential new entrants). Another argument as to why market 
concentration may not be an adequate measure of competition is related to the fact 
that it does not take into account the potential competition from other non-bank 
financial institutions, such as the micro-finance institutions which, in CEE countries, 
compete with banks especially in the credit market (Riess et al., 2002).8 In addition, 
8 Often data on other financial institutions are lacking and Fitch-IBCA Bankscope database consists of 
bank data exclusively. Therefore, extending analysis with the impact of other financial institutions in 
the banking sector falls beyond the scope of the paper. 
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banks operating in a country face competition also from banks operating in other 
countries. For example, in 2005, the cross-border loans to firms in CEE countries 
averaged at 7.6% of GDP (Herzberg and Watson, 2007). However, access to cross-
border loans is more likely to be available for large multi-national companies, while 
small and medium sized enterprises are not likely to have easy access to cross-
border financing since they are more prone to asymmetric information problems 
that stem from the lack of credit record and the lack of adequate collateral (Caviglia 
et al., 2002). Based on this, it may be assumed that banks operating in larger 
economies, which have a larger pool of foreign companies, are likely to face more 
competition than banks operating in smaller economies where competition is more 
likely to be limited within the country boundaries.
The observable factors such as the number of banks, degree of market concentration 
and the cross-border lending discussed above may to some extent serve as 
indicators of banking system competition, but these do not necessarily measure the 
degree of competition. In spite of the fact that foreign banks are considered to have 
induced competition in the banking systems, it should not be taken for granted that 
a high level of competition will persist in these markets. According to Kraft (2004), 
foreign banks are becoming increasingly accommodated to high profits, especially 
in South-Eastern Europe countries which may make them unwilling to engage in 
aggressive competition that could eventually undermine their profits.
The bank-specific data in this study are sourced from the Fitch-IBCA Bankscope 
database, which provides annual data on banks operating all around the globe. 
Apart from the readily available indicators in this database, we have used the 
available information to generate additional indicators. Given that the readily 
available BankScope database provides information only on the current ownership 
of the bank, we have used the shareholders’ history from this database to identify 
the bank’s ownership for the available years as well as the country origin of the 
foreign bank owners. In this manner, we have constructed the dv_foreign variable 
which takes a value of 1 if the bank is 51% or more owned by foreigners, and 0 
otherwise. Similarly, we have constructed the dv_origin variable which takes 
a value of 1 if the foreign bank comes from an EU-12 country or United States 
and 0 if the foreign bank’s origin is some other country. However, it must be noted 
that these two variables are characterized by more pronounced missing data which 
reduces our sample size.
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Table 4: Summary statistics of variables
Variable  Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max
int_inc_real 2916 105167 235138 115 3177846
p_funds 2906 0.039 0.036 0.000 0.816
p_labour 2495 0.018 0.015 0.001 0.220
p_physcapital 2884 2.454 5.332 0.029 94.029
loans_ta 2904 0.550 0.203 0.000 1.396
equity_ta 2926 0.154 0.133 -0.124 0.987
prov_loans 2628 0.019 0.049 -0.482 0.497
Ta 2926 1732561 3849060 2981 38100000
Rgdpgrowth 2909 3.976 4.172 -17.729 13.501
ebrd_bankreform 2914 3.343 0.572 1.000 4.000
dv_foreign 2155 0.638 0.481 0.000 1.000
dv_origin 2155 0.484 0.500 0.000 1.000
Source: Fitch-IBCA Bankscope database and authors’ calculations
The data on the real GDP growth rates are obtained from the European Union 
Commission (AMECO database) and International Monetary Fund. The index 
on banking reform is obtained from the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD) Transition Reports. Summary statistics are presented in 
Table 4 show the variability of the data included in the analysis. The table also 
shows that the number of observations for the dummy variable dv_foreign and dv_
origin is smaller than for other variables due to availability of the data on banks’ 
ownership in the Fitch-IBCA Bankscope database.
5. Estimation results and discussion
This section presents the estimation results from the application of the P-R model to 
measure banking sector competition in the CEE countries during the period 1999-
2009. Table 5 presents the results derived from five different model specifications, 
which are explained in the notes below the table. The results of the main model 
specification are presented in the first column of the table.
The estimation results suggest that the behaviour of banks operating in the CEE 
countries is consistent with monopoly behaviour given that the sum of the coefficients 
of input prices (logp_funds, logp_labour, logp_physcapital) has produced a negative 
H-statistic equal to -0.064 (Table 5, Specification 1). The linear combination test 
suggests that the joint impact of the input prices on the interest income (i.e. the 
dependent variable) is statistically insignificant, implying that the H-statistic is 
not significantly different from zero. This provides further evidence in support of 
the monopoly behaviour, given that also an H=0 is considered to imply monopoly 
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behaviour (Table 6). The negative value of the H-statistic suggests that the increase 
of input prices leads to a reduction of banks’ interest revenues. Under a monopoly 
structure, an increase of input prices will increase firms’ marginal costs which will 
lead to an increase of output prices and to a reduction of the level of output. The 
reduction of the output level will subsequently lead to a decline of banks’ revenues. It 
should also be acknowledged that a negative H-statistic might also be consistent with 
oligopoly. In this context, the negative value of the H-statistic might still signal that 
the banking sectors of the CEE countries exert a high degree of market power, but the 
magnitude of the market power would be lower than in the case of monopoly. Taking 
into consideration the number of banks operating in the CEE countries, the finding 
that the banking systems of these countries have been characterized by monopoly 
behaviour may be considered as unexpected. However, the persisting low degree of 
financial intermediation, the higher interest rate spreads compared to the Euro Area 
and the slow progress in the development of competition policy, may represent 
important illustrative facts that banks that have operated in the CEE during the period 
1999-2009 have behaved like monopolies.
As discussed earlier, the studies that have applied the P-R model have not reached 
a conclusion on whether the interest income or the total income is more appropriate 
measure to be used as dependent variable. Therefore, to test for the robustness 
of the results, we have run an additional regression using total income as the 
dependent variable. The results seem to be consistent, producing an H-statistic of 
-0.14. In absolute size is larger than the H-statistic obtained in the first specification 
but still negative, suggesting that CEE banking sectors are characterized by 
monopoly behaviour (Table 5, Specification 2). Given that both specifications 
produce a negative H-statistic, it may be considered that the choice between the 
interest income and total income for the dependent variable is not highly relevant 
for the estimation of the competitive behaviour of the banks.
The non-EU and EU CEE countries differ in many aspects of banking sector structure 
and overall operating environment. Thus, we have also tested whether the degree of 
banking sector competition in the non-EU members of the CEE region was different 
from the EU members of this region. We have conducted this test by interacting each 
of the input prices variables (i.e. the components of the H-statistic) with the dummy 
variable dv_noneu, which takes value of 1 if the country is not an EU member 
(Table 5, specification 3).9 According to Brambor et al. (2006), the coefficient of a 
constitutive component of the interaction term can be interpreted alone only assuming 
that the other constitutive component of the interaction term equals zero. In our 
9 The inclusion of the interaction term is done in line with Brambor et al. (2006) who suggest that in 
the case of multiplicative interaction models, the regression should include all the constitutive terms 
of the interaction term and the interaction term itself. These authors suggest that the coefficients of 
the constitutive terms should not be interpreted as average effects. The coefficient of one component 
term can be interpreted only assuming that the other component of the interaction term equals zero.
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case, the coeficients of the primary variables p_funds, p_labour and p_physcapital 
reflect the impact of input prices on banks’ revenues when the other component of the 
interaction term (i.e. dv_noneu) equals zero. The coefficients of the interaction terms 
in our regression (logpfunds_dvnoneu, logplabour_dvnoneu and logpphyscapital_
dvnoneu) suggest that when dv_noneu equals 1, i.e. when the country is a non-EU 
member, the input prices have a statistically significant additional impact on bank’s 
revenues compared to the situation when the country is an EU member.
Table 5: Estimation results of the H-statistic for the CEE countries
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Laglogint_inc_real 0.856*** 0.748*** 0.171***
(0.071) (0.062) (0.043)
logp_funds 0.129*** 0.156*** 0.220*** 0.376*** 0.342***
(0.042) (0.050) (0.050) (0.031) (0.034)
logp_labour -0.141*** -0.185** -0.173*** 0.155*** 0.154***
(0.046) (0.091) (0.058) (0.019) (0.022)
logp_physcapital -0.051 -0.111 -0.134*** 0.025** 0.024**
(0.035) (0.082) (0.045) (0.010) (0.010)
loans_ta 0.063 0.072 0.061 0.193** 0.379***
(0.077) (0.123) (0.089) (0.097) (0.100)
equity_ta -0.853** -1.559* -1.287*** 0.541*** 0.582**
(0.346) (0.855) (0.351) (0.199) (0.271)
prov_loans -0.168 0.916* -0.215 -0.179 -0.645
(0.297) (0.539) (0.323) (0.394) (0.516)
Rgdpgrowth 0.022*** 0.020*** 0.019*** 0.005*** 0.008***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
ebrd_bankref -0.161*** -0.186** -0.102 0.027 -0.059
(0.062) (0.080) (0.067) (0.028) (0.036)
dv_foreign 0.066 0.047 0.070 -0.030 -0.049*
(0.042) (0.077) (0.051) (0.023) (0.025)
dv_origin 0.057 0.122 0.098* 0.017 -0.006
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Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Logta 0.850***
(0.046)
dv_year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
dv_country Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 1.747*** 3.286** 3.222*** -0.143 -0.807***
(0.654) (1.477) (0.704) (0.173) (0.254)
Observations 1,610 1,607 1,610 1,610 1,610
Number of banks 299 298 299 299 299
Note a): Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Note b): Specification 1 uses the real interest income as dependent variable; Specification 2 uses 
the real total income as dependent variable; Specification 3 uses real interest income as 
dependent variable, but includes the interactions of input price variables with the dummy 
variable for non-EU countries; Specification 4 uses the interest income to total assets ratio 
as dependent variable; Specification 5 uses the real interest income as dependent variable, 
but includes the total assets variable among the explanatory variables.
Source: Authors’ calculations
Summing up, the coefficient of each interaction term (logpfunds_dvnoneu, 
logplabour_dvnoneu and logpphyscapital_dvnoneu) with the coefficient of its 
respective constitutive term (p_funds, p_labour and p_physcapital), the H-statistic 
for the non-EU members of our sample is obtained. This represents the impact 
of input prices on bank’s revenues when the country is an EU member plus the 
additional impact when the country is not an EU member. The sum of these 
coefficients is presented in Table 6 (specification 3) and shows an H-statistic of 
-0.30 for the non-EU countries. The fact the H-statistic for non-EU countries is 
smaller than the H-statistic for the whole sample, suggests that the banking sectors 
of non-EU countries are characterized by a lower degree of competition compared 
to the banking sectors of the EU countries. 
The non-EU countries of the CEE region have been characterized by a lower degree 
of financial intermediation, higher interest rate spreads, and lower development 
of competition policy, compared to the EU members of the region, which might 
serve as indicators of a lower degree of banking sector competition in these 
countries. Banks operating in the non-EU countries of the CEE are also likely 
to face less competition from cross-border lending, given the smaller number of 
large foreign corporations operating in these countries. In addition, the persistently 
high profitability ratios recorded by the banking sectors of these countries might 
have well accommodated banks in the existing positions as to not induce a more 
aggressive competitive behaviour which could eventually undermine their profits.
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The coefficient on the lagged dependent variable (Laglogintinc_real) is positive and 
highly significant, showing a high level of persistence of the bank interest revenues 
over the periods (Table 5). This implies that bank revenues in the current year are 
largely consistent with the bank revenues in the previous year. The statistically 
significant coefficient of the lagged dependent variable confirms the dynamic nature 
of our model and may serve as evidence in support to Goddard and Wilson (2009) 
who suggest that the P-R model should be estimated using dynamic models rather 
than static models as used by the majority of studies applying this method. 
Regarding other control variables, the degree of risk-aversion, measured by the 
equity to total assets ratio (equity_ta) has a negative and statistically significant 
coefficient, showing that more conservative banks tend to generate less interest 
income. However, this could be interpreted as more capitalized banks have more 
leverage to be more aggressive in the market via lower interest rates. The structure 
of the assets (loans_ta) and the quality of the loan portfolio (prov_loans) have 
statistically insignificant coefficients. Also, bank’s ownership (dv_foreign) and 
country-of-origin (dv_origin) both statistically insignificant coefficients. Regarding 
country-level variables, the real GDP growth rate (rgdpgrowth) has a positive and 
statistically significant coefficient, while the banking reform index (ebrd_bankref) 
is significantly negative. This implies that overall operating environment of banks 
leads to more efficient banking markets via lower interest rate margins. 
Table 6: Joint impact of the input prices on the dependent variable
 Model specification Coefficient Std. error z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval]
Specification 1 -0.064 0.066 -0.960 0.337 -0.194 0.066
Specification 2 -0.140 0.138 -1.020 0.309 -0.410 0.130
Specification 3 -0.300 0.115 -2.610 0.009 -0.526 -0.075
Specification 4 0.556 0.043 13.070 0.000 0.473 0.640
Specification 5 0.519 0.051 10.220 0.000 0.419 0.618
Note a): The joint impact of the input prices on the dependent variable is calculated using the 
linear combinations command (lincom) in STATA. The coefficient column in this table 
represents the sum of the coefficients on logp_funds, logp_labour and logp_physcapital 
(for Specification 3: logpfunds_dvnoneu+logp_funds, logplabour_dvnoneu+logp_
labour, logpphyscapital_dvnoneu+logp_physcapital) which produces the H-statistic.
Note b): Specification 1 corresponds to the model with the interest income as dependent 
variable; Specification 2 corresponds to the model with the total income as dependent 
variable; Specification 3 uses real interest income as dependent variable, but includes 
the interactions of input price variables with the dummy variable for non-EU countries; 
Specification 4 corresponds to the model with the interest income to total assets ratio as 
dependent variable; Specification 5 corresponds to the model with the interest income as 
dependent variable, but which includes also total assets among the explanatory variables.
Source: Authors’ calculations
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The main finding of our analysis is that the competitive behaviour of banks 
operating in the CEE countries complies with monopoly behaviour. This is not 
consistent with the findings of the most other studies that have applied the P-R 
model to investigate banking sector competition for the CEE countries, as well as 
with studies that have applied this approach to other regions which have mostly 
found monopolistic competition (Mamatzakis et al., 2005; Yildirim and Philippatos, 
2007; Claessens and Laeven, 2004). However, this difference might be attributed 
to the model specification, given that we have made an improvement to the model 
specification by taking into account the suggestion of Bikker et al. (2012; 2007) 
not to scale the dependent variable (i.e. interest income or total income) to total 
assets, but also not to control for total assets among the explanatory variables. In 
order to test the hypothesis of Bikker et al. (2012), that the inclusion of total assets 
as an explanatory variable leads to a higher and always positive H-statistic, we 
have estimated equation 2 by scaling the dependent variable to total assets (Table 
5, Specification 4). As expected, the H-statistic turns from negative in the previous 
specification to positive with a coefficient of 0.556 which would suggest that the 
behaviour of banks operating in the CEE countries is consistent with monopolistic 
competition (Table 6, Specification 5).10 Similarly, we estimate equation 2 with 
total assets (logta) among the explanatory variables. The results are similar with an 
H-statistic of 0.519 (Table 5, Specification 5). These results may serve as important 
evidence in support of the hypothesis of Bikker et al. (2012; 2007) on the use of 
total assets to scale the dependent variable or to control for total assets in a Panzar-
Rosse model, suggesting that the application of the Panzar-Rosse model requires to 
maintain the reduced-form revenue equation. Otherwise, the transformation of the 
reduced-form revenue equation into a price equation will lead to biased results.
6. Conclusions
The estimation results have produced a negative H-statistic, which implies that the 
behaviour of banks operating in the CEE countries is consistent with monopoly 
behaviour – the first hypothesis of the paper. Taking into consideration the number 
of banks operating in the banking markets of CEE countries, this finding might 
be considered as unexpected. However, the persisting low degree of financial 
intermediation, the higher interest rate spreads compared to the Euro Area and the 
slow progress in the development of competition policies may represent important 
illustrative facts suggesting that the banks that have operated in the CEE during 
10 Given that the scaling of the dependent variable to total assets and the inclusion of total assets as an 
explanatory variable (Specifications 4 and 5) transform the reduced-form revenue equation into a 
price equation (i.e. the dependent variable becomes the ex post interest rate), in these specifications 
the control variables equity_ta, loans_ta, prov_loans, and logta are treated as endogenous based on 
the predicted relationship between these variables and the interest rate. 
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the period 1999-2009 have behaved like monopolies. Nevertheless, it should be 
acknowledged that a negative H-statistic might be consistent also with oligopoly 
market structure, implying that our estimate of the H-statistic would still signal the 
presence of a high degree of market power, but which is more moderate compared 
to the monopoly. 
Within the CEE sample of countries, market power resulted to be higher among 
the banks operating in the non-EU countries of the CEE region compared to the 
EU countries of this region – the second hypothesis of the paper. These countries 
have been characterized by lower degree of financial intermediation, higher interest 
rate spreads, and lower development of competition policy, compared to the EU 
members of the CEE region. The banks operating in the non-EU countries of the 
CEE are also likely to face less competition from cross-border lending. In addition, 
the persistently high profitability ratios recorded by the banking sectors of these 
countries might have well accommodated banks in their existing positions as to not 
induce a more aggressive competitive behaviour, which could eventually undermine 
their profits. Therefore, the results suggest that despite the opening to the entry of 
foreign banks, the banking sectors of the CEE region still remain uncompetitive 
and, hence, there may be ample room for a further enhancement of the financial 
intermediation efficiency in the countries through the increase of competition. 
This paper has addressed an important methodological problem related to the 
Panzar-Rosse approach. Our results provide support for the hypothesis of Bikker 
et al. (2012; 2007) – the third hypothesis of the paper – who suggest that scaling 
the dependent variable or controlling for total assets in the regression transforms 
the revenue equation into a price equation and, hence, produces an upwards biased 
H-statistic that always rejects monopoly. This may lead to misleading results with 
implications in policy-making. Therefore, the results produced from this study may 
be considered to be more reliable compared to other studies that have used this 
method to estimate the banking sector competition. The other specification issue 
was related to the choice between interest income and total income to be used as 
dependent variable. The results have generally been consistent using either of these 
two variables, suggesting that the choice between the interest income and the total 
income for the dependent variable is not highly important for the measurement of 
banking sector competition using the Panzar-Rosse approach.
Having into consideration the importance of banking sector competition for the 
financial intermediation efficiency and the main finding of this paper that the 
degree of competition in these countries is low, the main policy implication of this 
paper is that the authorities in the CEE countries should take additional measures 
to induce the banking sector competition. Central banks could encourage entry 
(making the market more contestable), but at the same time should take care of 
the quality of new entrants. The general ‘enabling’ environment that attracts entry 
of sound banks, in conjunction with strict regulation and supervision is important 
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policy implication. Also competition authorities may be more active in identifying 
possible collusive behavior of banking sectors in the region. 
Regulatory institutions can also focus in other measures that reduce the barriers 
to competition. For example, banks should make the ‘terms and conditions’ of 
individual bank products easily understandable for the clients so that they can 
make comparisons between the products offered by different banks. In addition, the 
authorities should make sure that the ‘switching costs’ between banks do not serve 
as a source of market power for the banks.
We consider that this paper offers a good ground for the analysis of the competitive 
conditions in the banking sectors of the CEE countries, but we strongly recommend 
further research to be undertaken in order to further strengthen the inferences on 
the competitive behaviour of banks in this region. In this paper the impact of the 
global financial crisis and post-crisis period was not under investigation. Global 
financial crisis and the post-crisis period represents turbulent and structural changes 
in the banking sectors worldwide, including the CEE countries. This may have 
led to short-run ‘equilibrium solutions’ in the light of regulatory changes, overall 
institutional responses and takeovers, mergers and acquisitions in the banking 
sectors. This, in concert with rapid changes in technology and digitalization in 
banking, requires rethinking methodologies of measuring competition, including 
variables that construct models, i.e. the input prices variables in the Panzar-Rosse 
model. Therefore, the impact of the global financial crisis and post-crisis structural 
changes in the banking sector competition pose important agenda for future 
research. In addition, the Panzar-Rosse approach measures the average competitive 
behaviour of the banks in the totality of their operations. However, given that 
banks organize their operations based on different business segments, it would be 
an interesting exercise to measure the competitive behaviour of banks across those 
different business segments. Boone indicator may represent a suitable method for 
this purpose.
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Procjena konkurentnosti  bankarskog sektora u zemljama srednje i istočne 
Europe: Panzar-Rosseov pristup1
Arben Mustafa2, Valentin Toçi3
Sažetak 
Konkurentnost bankarskog sektora u svjetlu tranzicijskog procesa u zemljama 
Srednje i Istočne Europe (SIE) od posebnog je interesa istraživačima i kreatorima 
politike, osobito nakon ulaska stranih banaka i koncentriranih tržišta. U ovom se 
radu koristi Panzar-Rosseov pristup za procjenu stupnja konkurentnosti 
bankarskog sektora u Srednjoj i Istočnoj Europi. Primjenom opće metode 
momenata na panel analizu 300 banaka za razdoblje 1999-2009, empirijski dokazi 
upućuju na to da banke koje djeluju u srednjoj i istočnoj Europi djeluju u uvjetima 
monopolskog tržišta. S metodološkog stajališta, rezultati upućuju na to da u 
Panzar-Rosseovom pristupu, upotreba jednadžbe cijena ili kontrolne varijable 
imovine stvara unaprijed pristranu i pogrešnu procjenu H-statističkih podataka. 
Stoga se služimo reduciranim oblikom jednadžbe prihoda pri procjeni Panzar-
Rosseovog modela. Nadalje, rezultati ukazuju da u zemljama Srednje i Istočne 
Europe koje nisu članice EU-a, banke imaju jaču tržišnu snagu u usporedbi s 
bankama koje djeluju u zemljama članicama EU-a u ovoj regiji. Nositelji politike 
trebali bi poboljšati konkurentne uvjete i opće “omogućavanje” okružja za 
bankarske sektore, osobito u zemljama Srednje i Istočne Europe koje nisu članice 
EU-a, pritom vodeći računa o konkurentnosti i stabilnosti.
Ključne riječi: banke, konkurencija, Panzar-Rosseov pristup, Srednja i Istočna 
Europa
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